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Jeremy Taylor* Re-thinking Whitbread v. Walley: Liberal
Justice and the Judicial Review of
Damages Caps Under Section 7 of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms
This paper advances a theoretically-driven reconstruction of s.7 Charter doctrine, which
currently precludes protection for personal injury damages. Proceeding from a standpoint
built on deontological strains of tort theory, the author dissects the reasoning in Whitbread
v. Walley, the governing authority on the applicability of s. 7 to legislated damages caps. In
three stages, the author argues that in the contemporary context, theoretical and doctrinal
support for Whitbread is weak. First, when tort rights are theorized non-instrumentally, rights
to personal injury damages fall squarely within the irreducible sphere of personal autonomy
now protected by s. 7. Second, recent developments, both in civil recourse theory and in
Charter doctrine, suggest that rights to personal injury damages can no longer be treated as
beyond the realm of constitutional jurisprudence. Third, and most importantly, the specter of
Lochner v. New York can no longer be invoked to justify the wholesale exclusion of tort rights
from s. 7 protection. Discrete heads of damage can be separated into two categories: those
based entirely on rights to bodily integrity (bodily claims), and those based at least partly on
distributive entitlements (distributive claims). The author argues that constitutional doctrine
can protect morally legitimate bodily claims by protecting some heads of damage (non-
pecuniary damage and cost of care), and by leaving heads of damage based on morally
imperfect distributive claims (past income loss and loss of earning capacity) to the policy
discretion of the state. The article concludes with a short discussion of s. 1 issues, and of
some possible broader applications of the bodily - distributive claim framework.
Cet article propose une reconstitution thdorique de la doctrine sous-jacente . Particle 7 de
la Charte, qui exclut actuellement la protection relative l des dommages pour prejudice
corporel. Partant d'un point de vue qui sappuie sur des souches ddontologiques de la
thdorie du ddlit, Iauteur disseque le raisonnement dans I'arrdt Whitbread c. Walley,
qui fait autoritd sur I'applicabilit6 de Part. 7 au plafonnement des dommages par la loi.
L'auteur avance, en trois 6tapes, que dans le contexte actuel, la thdorie et la doctrine
n'offrent quun faible appui I Parrdt Whitbread. Premidrement, lorsque les droits en matiere
ddlictuelle sont ddfinis en thdorie, en faisant abstraction de tout concept physique, les
droits i des dommages pour prejudice corporel s'inscrivent directement dans la sphdre
irrdductible de Pautonomie personnelle ddsormais protegde par Particle 7. Deuxidmement,
les ddveloppements rdcents, tant en thdorie des recours civils que dans la doctrine de la
Charte, suggdrent que les droits J des dommages pour prejudice corporel ne peuvent
plus 6tre traitds comme s'ils dtaient hors du domaine de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle.
Troisidmement, et c'est le point le plus important, il nest plus possible dinvoquer le spectre
de Lochner c. New York pour justifier I'exclusion gdndrale des droits en matiere ddlictuelle
de la protection offerte par Part. 7 de la Charte. Les chefs de dommages discrdtionnaires
peuvent 6tre divisds en deux catdgories : ceux qui sont fondds entidrement sur le droit
. Pintdgrit6 physique (reclamations pour prejudice corporel) et ceux qui sont fondds, du
moins en partie, sur les droits distributifs (reclamations distributives). L'auteur alldgue que la
doctrine constitutionnelle peutprotdger les reclamations pour prejudice corporel moralement
Idgitimes en protdgeant certains chefs de dommages (dommages non pdcuniaires et coot
des soins) et en laissant les chefs de dommages fondds sur des reclamations distributives
moralement imparfaites (pertes de revenus antdrieurs et perte de la capacit6 de gagner sa
vie) , la discretion politique de I'Etat. Larticle conclut sur une brdve discussion des enjeux
lids I Part. 1 et de certaines applications 6ventuelles plus large du cadre de reclamations
pour prejudice corporel et de reclamations distributives.
* LL.M. (Dal) 2006; Barrister & Solicitor (Alberta). The author would like to thank Professors
Vaughan Black, Richard Devlin, and Sheila Wildeman for their invaluable comments on initial drafts
and revisions to this paper, and also Professors Dianne Pothier and Jennifer Llewellyn, who provided
helpful input during a faculty seminar at which this paper was presented.
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II. Locating liberal justice in contemporary tort theory
III. The framers 'intent argument: autonomy over bodily integrity, choice,
and the normative content of tort rights
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monopolization
V. The anti-Lochner argument: private justice, distributive justice, and
the realm of constitutional adjudication
Conclusion: re-thinking Whitbread
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to present an argument in favour of redefining
the constitutional status of personal injury damages in Canada. The
desirability of redefinition is occasioned by continuing legislative
incursions into the realm of compensatory remedies,' as well as significant
developments in liberal theory, tort theory, and constitutional doctrine. To
date, constitutional analysis of damages caps has focused on s. 15 of the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 While an understanding of equality
issues is critical to a comprehensive view of the field, concerns of liberal
justice suggest a second direction for analysis: the rights to liberty and
security of the person guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter. Following the
reasoning used by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Whitbread v.
Walley,3 affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, Canadian courts have
1. For example, the recent enacting of damage caps in the field of motor vehicle accident
compensation: Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000 c. 1-3, s. 650.1 and Minor Injury Regulation, Alta. Reg.
123/2004; Insurance Act, R.S.N.B. 1973 c. 1-12, s. 265.21 and Injury Regulation, N.B. Reg. 2003-20;
Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 231, ss. 5, 113 and Automobile Insurance Tort Recovery Limitation
Regulations, N.S. Reg. 182/ 2003.
2. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11. For an example of a s. 15 analysis of damages caps see Barbara Billingsley, "Legislative Reform
and Equal Access to the Justice System: An Examination of Alberta's New Minor Injury Cap in the
Context of Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev.
711.
3. (1987), 45 D.L.R. (4') 729, [1987] B.C.J. No. 2124 (S.C.) [ Whitbread (S.C.)]; (1988), 51 D.L.R.
(4"') 509, [1988] B.C.J. No. 733 (C.A.) [Whitbread (C.A.)]; (1990), 77 D.L.R. (4"') 25, [1990] S.C.J.
No. 138 (S.C.C.) [Whitbread(S.C.C.)].
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shied away from granting constitutional status to a right to recover personal
injury damages under s. 7. In this paper, my central claim is that viewed
from the standpoint of liberal justice, the reasoning in Whitbread should
be reconsidered. Liberal theories of justice, along with recent doctrinal
developments, favour the protection of an analytically circumscribed right
to personal injury damages as a key component of liberty and security.
The paper is limited in both theoretical and doctrinal focus. The
theoretical focus is limited two ways. First, I restrict my analysis to
liberal theories of justice, on the assumption that Canadian constitutional
values are informed by a generally liberal understanding of the citizen-
state relationship. Second, my analysis is restricted to a deontological
(rights-based) rather than utilitarian (teleological) view of liberalism. In
general, deontological theory sees the right as connected to the good,
while teleological theory sees the right as separate from, and subsidiary
to, a conception of social good.4 Throughout the paper, I am sympathetic
to the deontological point of view, and to the general tenets of liberal
egalitarianism. Since the publication of Rawls's A Theory of Justice,
liberal theory has drifted away from utilitarianism, toward deontological
conceptions of rights. This shift can, and should, influence our ways of
thinking about both tort law and constitutional rights. My arguments reflect
this shift: the paper is driven by my suspicion that behind legislative limits
on compensatory remedies lies crudely utilitarian thinking.
My doctrinal focus is also twice limited. First, although a fully developed
doctrinal discussion of s. 7 requires analysis of three distinct frameworks
(the substantive rights guarantee, the principles of fundamental justice,
and s. 1 justification), the scope of my analysis is limited to the substantive
rights guarantee. This restriction is tied to my deontological approach. In
general, deontological theories are more germane to the interpretation of
constitutional rights than utilitarian theories, and the substantive rights
guarantees of the Charter are understood as entrenching a deontological
conception of rights.' Second, my doctrinal analysis only scratches the
surface. While I engage doctrinal points, the paper is primarily a theoretical
piece. My doctrinal aim is to suggest areas ofjurisprudential traction for the
theoretical points presented. I do not attempt a comprehensive recitation
of the case law.
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971) at 22-27 [Rawls,
Justice].
5. L.E. Weinrib and E.J. Weinrib, "Constitutional Values and Private Law in Canada" in D.
Friedmann and D. Barak-Erez, eds., Human Rights in Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2001) 42; R.
Devlin, "Jurisprudence for Judges: Why Legal Theory Matters for Social Context Education" (2001)
27 Queen's L.J. 161 at 180.
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I. Whitbread v. Walley
The basic principle of tort compensation is that a successful plaintiff is
entitled to be put in the same position as he or she would have been in had
the tort not been committed, in so far as money can do so. 6 In a restricted
context, this paper attempts to analyze whether, and how, this principle
should be constitutionally protected. To do so, I use a case-specific
approach, focusing on Whitbread. I do so simply because Whitbread
represents the presently authoritative statement of law. Since Whitbread
addresses a challenge to a legislated damages cap, my analysis focuses
on the context of damages caps. But Whitbread has had significant impact
outside that context. Lower courts have used Whitbread not only to dismiss
challenges to damage caps, but also to dismiss challenges to ultimate
limitations legislation, challenges to aspects of workers' compensation
schemes, and challenges to legislation immunizing foreign states from tort
liability.7 The repercussions of my arguments also go beyond the context
of damages caps.8 A detailed analysis of such broader repercussions is
beyond the scope of this paper. But I will point to some further areas of
tort law that might be affected by my conclusions.
On March 27, 1983, John Whitbread was sleeping aboard a thirty-two
foot pleasure craft (the "Calrossie") which was traveling on IndianArm, part
of the Pacific Ocean near Vancouver. While Whitbread slept, Robert Walley
piloted the Calrossie. While Walley was piloting the craft, the Calrossie
struck some rocks close to shore. Whitbread suffered significant injuries,
including a fractured spine and permanent quadriplegia. Whitbread brought
a personal injury action against Walley and the owners of the Calrossie.
Walley served a summary trial motion, seeking a declaratory judgment
limiting his liability pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act9. Walley relied
on s. 647 of the Act, which capped all liability for injuries arising from
the acts or omissions of persons involved in navigation of a ship to 3,100
gold francs, the equivalent of roughly $103,000.00. Whitbread defended
the motion, in part, on the basis that s. 647 violated his s. 7 rights to life,
6. Ratych v. Bloomer (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4
h) 25 at 40, [1990] S.C.J. No. 37 (S.C.C.).
7. Hernandez v. Palmer (1992), 15 C.C.L.1. (2d) 187 at 214-216, [1992] O.J. No. 2648 (Sup.Ct.)
(no-fault damage cap regime for motor vehicle accidents); Wittman v. Emmott, [1989] B.C.J. No. 1188
(S.C.) (ultimate limitation for commencing action); Budge v. Alberta (Workers'Compensation Board)
(1991), 77 D.L.R. (4
th) 361 at 368, [1991] 3 W.W.R. I (Alta C.A.) (workers' compensation); Bouzari
v. Iran, [2002] O.J. No. 1624 (Sup. Ct.) at para. 78, aff'd (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 675 (C.A.), [2004] O.J.
No. 2800, leave to appeal dismissed (2004), 122 C.R.R. (2d) 376, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 410 (S.C.C.).
8. I am indebted to Professor Vaughan Black for his invaluable assistance in highlighting the
broader implications of my argument.
9. R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9 (hereinafter the "Act"). In 2001, the relevant portions of the Canada Shipping
Act were repealed, and replaced by a liability scheme (which also includes a damages cap) set out in
Part Ill of the Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c. 6.
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liberty, and security of the person.'" As a main part of his Charter argument,
Whitbread argued that his life, liberty, or security of the person was violated
because the compensation to which he would be entitled at common law
would far exceed the $103,000.00 cap. Contemporary case law suggests
that absent the Act, Whitbread would have been awarded compensation
exceeding $1,000,000.00 for non-pecuniary loss and future cost of care
alone." The chambers justice (MacKinnon J.) dismissed Whitbread's s. 7
challenge, but dismissed Walley's motion on other grounds. Citing case law
applying s. 7 in the context of occupational rights and corporate marketing
rights, the chambers justice held that Whitbread's claim for damages fell
within the economic realm, and was plainly beyond the scope of s. 7.12
The Court of Appeal allowed Walley's appeal, but dismissed Whitbread's
cross-appeal. Whitbread appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, where
the Court dismissed the Charter arguments from the bench (per Dickson
C.J.), no written reasons provided.
3
Given the lack of reasons for the Supreme Court of Canada judgment,
the Court of Appeal's reasons for judgment form the subject of this paper.
Whitbread made two arguments on appeal. Writing for the unanimous
panel, McLachlin J.A. (as she then was) summarized the first argument
as claiming that "a claim for an economic interest which is founded on a
deprivation of life, liberty, or security of the person falls within s. 7." The
Court of Appeal summarized the second argument as suggesting that "a
claim for an economic interest which may enhance a person's ability to
acquire aids and amenities to improve the person's life, liberty, or security
of the person, falls under s. 7 of the Charter." The Court ofAppeal deployed
three main reasons to dispose of these arguments. The first reason, which I
will call the framers' intent argument, was that the framers of the Charter
did not see fit to include compensatory rights within the scope of s. 7.
The second reason, which I will call the state action argument, was that
Whitbread had suffered his injuries as a result of the accident, not as a
result of state action. The third reason, which I will call the anti-Lochner
argument,' 4 was that giving constitutional status to Whitbread's damages
claim would grant constitutional status to virtually all property interests.1
5
10. S. 649 of the Act was also challenged on the basis of s. 15 of the Charter and the division of
powers, and much of the Courts' reasons deal with those issues.
I. See Milina v. Bartsch (1985), 49 B.C.L.R. (2d) 33, [1985] B.C.J. No. 2762 (S.C.).
12. Whitbread (S.C), supra note 3 at 733-736.
13. Whitbread (S.C.C.), supra note 3 at 32. La Forest J., for the Court, gave written reasons on the
federalism arguments, but not on the Charter arguments.
14. Following the case broadly understood to epitomize the era of constitutional intervention by the
United States Supreme Court in matters of economic regulation restricting private property rights,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. Whitbread(C.A.), supra note 3 at 519-522.
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After a short detour to focus our theoretical lens, I will return to assess each
of these arguments from the standpoint of liberal justice and contemporary
constitutional doctrine.
II. Locating liberal justice in contemporary tort theory
The project of this paper is to assess Whitbread according to a standpoint
of liberal justice: a standpoint that engages liberal theory, Charter rights,
and tort law. From this perspective, tort law's claim for Charter status
must be staked out on the common ground of liberal theory. To create
this common ground, the standpoint of liberal justice requires two sets of
linkages. First, it needs a tie between liberal theory and Charter rights.
The deontological approach establishes this tie. To that end, where issues
of political and constitutional theory arise, I use a framework of analysis
generally informed by Rawls's theory of justice as fairness. Second, the
standpoint needs to tie liberal theory to the normative content of tort law.
For tort law to claim constitutional status there should be some sort of
bond between the two. Contemporary tort theory, generally liberal in
orientation, provides the tie necessary for this analysis. But tort theory
has a broad sweep. To properly focus our theoretical lens, we need to use
only those approaches to tort theory appropriate to the deontological and
constitutional context.
Tort theory can be broadly classified as instrumental (functionalist)
or non-instrumental (non-functionalist). Instrumental theories conceive
tort law primarily as a tool for achieving social goals, such as efficiency,
compensation, deterrence, wealth redistribution, or loss spreading.16 For
the instrumentalist, understanding tort law involves understanding how
tort law does, and ought to, contribute to those independent social goals. 7
Instrumental theory denies that the history, structure, and content of tort
law reflect inherently normative features. In general, these theories are
motivated by utilitarian concerns. In contrast, non-instrumental theories
are generally based on individual moral rights, seen to emanate from the
structure and content of tort law itself. Non-instrumental theory argues
that tort law does, and should, reflect deeply embedded intuitions about
justice and personal responsibility. 8 Most non-instrumentalists are
concerned about the individual rights reflected in tort law, not the effects
of tort law on wealth, utility-maximization, or other social goals extrinsic
16. Stephen R. Perry, "The Moral Foundations of Tort Law" (1992) 77 Iowa L. Rev. 449 [Perry,
"Moral Foundations"].
17. Ernest J. Weinrib, "Understanding Tort Law" (1989) 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 485 at 488 [Weinrib,
"Understanding"].
18. Ernest J. Weinrib, "Corrective Justice" (1992) 77 Iowa L. Rev. 403 [Weinrib, "Corrective
Justice"].
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to the structure and content of tort law itself.1 9 Since Charter rights are
generally understood to entrench a deontological conception of rights, I
limit my analysis to non-instrumental theories of tort, which mostly use
deontological thinking.
John Goldberg develops a useful and nearly complete taxonomy
of contemporary tort theory, covering both instrumental and non-
instrumental perspectives. Goldberg marks five broad categories of
theories: compensation-deterrence theory, enterprise liability theory,
economic deterrence theory, social justice theory, and individual justice
theory."0 Four of these use instrumental approaches. Compensation-
deterrence theory, a theory-skeptical approach, sees tort law as a process
of ad hoc judicial legislation, undertaken to further two social policy goals:
deterrence of antisocial conduct and compensation of the injured.21 Also
skeptical of moral analysis, enterprise liability theory sees tort law as a
device, albeit an inefficient one, for providing needs-based relief to the
injured.22 Economic deterrence theories, exemplified in the works of Guido
Calabresi and Richard Posner, assume the purpose of tort law is to promote
overall social welfare through microeconomic analysis, using economic
incentives to deter accidents.23 Social justice theories, employing a critical
perspective, see tort as a device for rectifying imbalances in social power.
In the social justice approach, tort law is legitimate to the extent it protects
subordinated groups.24 Taken as a whole, these categories of theories have
diverse goals, but a common theme. All are driven in the first instance
by instrumental goals, and view the structure and content of tort law as
lacking inherent normative properties. For our purposes, these theories
are of limited use in establishing points of contact between the normative
elements of tort law and liberal justice.
Non-instrumental theories generally fall under the rubric of "individual
justice theory," the fifth category in Goldberg's taxonomy. Goldberg
identifies three species of individual justice theories: libertarian theory,
reciprocity theory, and corrective justice theory.25 Libertarian theory has
19. Jules L. Coleman, "Adding Institutional Insult to Personal Injury" (1991) 8 Yale J. on Reg. 223
at 228-230 [Coleman, "Personal Injury"].
20. John C.P. Goldberg, "Twentieth-Century Tort Theory" (2003) 91 Geo. L.J. 513.
21. Ibid. at 522, 525.
22. Ibid. at 537.
23. Ibid. at 544-45.
24. Ibid at 560. Ted DeCoste provides the best example of this perspective I have found in Canadian
scholarship. In DeCoste's view, the project of tort practice is to "disrupt the ruling consensus so as
to claim law's protection for the disempowered." Ted DeCoste, "Taking Torts Progressively" in Ken
Cooper-Stephenson and Elaine Gibson, eds., Tort Theory (North York: Captus Univ. Publications,
1993) at 240, 272-273.
25. Goldberg, supra note 20 at 563.
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both instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist varieties, both based on
inalienable rights to property and ownership. In its non-instrumental
variant, libertarian theory sees certain tort rules, such as strict liability,
as reflecting libertarian values.2 6 Focusing less on ownership, reciprocity
theory derives a Rawlsian principle of equal individual security from
the common elements of strict liability and negligence.2 1 Corrective
justice theory, developed from Aristotelian philosophy, sees tort law as
instantiating a rights-vindicating structure, inherent in the correlative
relationship of plaintiff and defendant.
28
In my view, two further species can be added to Goldberg's category of
individual justice theories: civil recourse theory and substantive equality
theory. In civil recourse theory, tort law embodies individual rights vis-
A-vis the state. Citizens are entitled to an institution of private recourse,
since tort law entrenches a principle of state-enabled private claims.
29
Substantive equality theory, best articulated in the work of Ken Cooper-
Stephenson, views contemporary tort doctrine as reflecting corrective
individualism at its core, but distributive egalitarianism in a comprehensive
system of social justice.30 For the purposes of this paper, I leave aside
libertarianism, which holds a pre-political view of justice inappropriate
for constitutional analysis.31 The remaining non-instrumental approaches,
including reciprocity, corrective justice, civil recourse and substantive
equality theories, construct the tort theory component of the standpoint of
liberal justice used in this paper.
Common to each theory informing the standpoint of liberal justice is
an approach Ben Zipursky calls the "conceptualist premise": the idea that a
theoretical account of law must provide an analysis of concepts embedded
26. Goldberg, supra note 20 at 565.
27. George P. Fletcher, "Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory" (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 at 550.
28. Ernest J. Weinrib, "The Special Morality of Tort Law" (1989) 34 McGill L. J. 403 at 408
[Weinrib, "Special Morality"]. For a general distillation of these ideas as expressed in variants of
contemporary corrective justice theory, see Ernest J. Weinrib, "Correlativity, Personality and the
Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice" (2001) 2:1 Theor. lnq. L. I [Weinrib, "Correlativity"].
29. Benjamin C. Zipursky, "Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice" (2003) 91 Geo. L.J. 695 at
735.
30. Ken Cooper-Stephenson, "Corrective Justice, Substantive Equality and Tort Law" and
"Economic Analysis, Substantive Equality and Tort Law" in Tort Theory, supra note 24, 48 at 53, and
131 at 159.
31. This is an argument that I will not fully develop here. My general view is that corrective justice
itself can only be partially understood on pre-political terms: Stephen Perry, "The Distributive Turn:
Mischief, Misfortune and Tort Law" (1997) 16:3 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 315 at 334 [Perry, "Distributive
Turn"]. Further, the libertarian view of personality is illogical in a comprehensive picture of corrective,
distributive and political justice, since it derives political principles from a pre-political notion of
personality: Arthur Ripstein, "The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort" (2004) 72 Fordham
L. Rev. 1811 at 1836 [Ripstein, "Division"].
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in the law.32 Conceptualist accounts can be placed on a methodological
spectrum. Formalist accounts, on one end of the spectrum, ascribe an
immanent rationality to law, founded on a structurally rigid base of moral
concepts.33 On the other end of the spectrum, pragmatic conceptualist
accounts identify moral concepts in the law through a framework that is
practice based, holistic, and open to revision. 4 Applying this spectrum to
our standpoint of liberal justice, corrective justice theory tends to be more
formalistic, while reciprocity, civil recourse, and substantive equality
theories tend toward the pragmatic end of the spectrum.
I agree with Izhak Englard's argument that a general approach to tort
law should incorporate both instrumental and non-instrumental views. 5
But I take a more narrow approach: the project of this paper is to examine
the normativity expressed by tort law itself, and the fit of that normativity
with constitutional rights. For the purpose of assessing the constitutional
status of personal injury damages, we are concerned not with the values
tort law should express, but those it does express. In the constitutional
and deontological context, the appropriate approach to tort law is non-
instrumental and conceptual.
III. The framers'intent argument: autonomy over bodily integrity,
choice, and the normative content of tort rights
Having constructed our standpoint of liberal justice, we can now return
to Whitbread. In Whitbread, McLachlin J.A. recognized the analytic
difficulties posed by the s. 7 issue. The Court of Appeal characterized the
Act as a legislative measure with an economic aspect arguably connected
to life, liberty, and security of the person.36 The main analytic problem
was that Whitbread's claim fell in the "difficult middle ground" between
entirely economic issues, such as a monetary disability imposed on a
corporation, and state action directly affecting life, liberty, or security of the
person. In analyzing this middle ground, the Court of Appeal characterized
personal injury damages as an economic benefit. Rather than theorizing
the normative context of the economic benefit, the Court of Appeal simply
equated economic benefits with property rights. The Court of Appeal
appears to have concluded that since the framers did not include property
rights in the text of s. 7, economic benefits were also beyond the scope
of s. 7. Granting Charter status to Whitbread's claim would require the
32. Zipursky, supra note 29 at 705.
33. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1995) at 23
[Weinrib, Private Law].
34. Zipursky, supra note 29 at 707.
35. lzhak Englard, "The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem American Tort Theory"
(1980) 9 J. Legal Stud. 27.
36. Whitbread (C.A), supra note 3 at 520.
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words "life, liberty and security of the person" to be read as if they were
amplified either by the phrase "or such economic benefit as the law may
award in their stead," or the phrase "or any benefit which may enhance
life, liberty, or security of the person."37
In a present day context, two doctrinal points are critical to assessing
the framers' intent argument. First, the idea that the s. 7 right to security
of the person categorically excludes economic "benefits which may
enhance life, liberty, or security of the person" has been thrown into doubt
by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Chaoulli v. Quebec
(Attorney General).38 In Chaoulli, the Court held that a right to contract for
private health insurance is protected as a right to security of the person, in
circumstances where the assistance of private health insurance is clinically
significant to an individual's current and future health.39 Second, since
Whitbread, the Supreme Court of Canada has extended the scope of s.
7 liberty rights. Liberty now includes the right to an irreducible sphere
of personal autonomy, where an individual may make inherently private
choices free from state interference. Those choices are protected if they
go to the core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity.4 ° The Supreme
Court of Canada now appears to approve the view that instead of invoking a
strict dichotomy between Charter rights and economic benefits, the proper
approach to s. 7 is to accord constitutional status to economic benefits
intimately connected to life, liberty, and security of the person.41 Leaving
aside, for the moment, the issue of state interference, the present doctrinal
context shifts our focus off the strict reasoning of the framers' intent
argument deployed in Whitbread. Instead, we must use the standpoint of
liberal justice to analyze the bond, if any, between tort law, personal injury
damages, autonomy over bodily integrity, and choice.
Within the standpoint of liberal justice, corrective justice theory,
particularly the Kantian version, establishes this connection at a highly
abstract level. Ernest Weinrib, the main theorist of the formalist school,
provides a starkly conceptual account of corrective justice. Drawing on
Aristotelian philosophy, Weinrib analyzes tort as a mode of intrinsic
ordering, to be understood on its own terms.42 The structure of an intrinsic
37. Whilbread (CA.), supra note 3 at 521.
38. (2005), 254 D.L.R. (4"') 577, [2005] S.C.J. No. 33 (Q.L.) [Chaoulli].
39. Ibid. at 627 (per McLachlin C.J. and Major J.).
40. R. v. Malmo-Levine (2003), 233 D.L.R. (41h) 415 at 457, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79 (per McLachlin
C.J. and Gonthier, lacobucci, Major, Bastarache and Binnie JJ.).
41. Indeed, although the author has been unable to locate an English version of the trial decision in
Chaoulli, it appears the trial judge (Pichd J.) used almost precisely this language: Chaoulli, supra note
38 at 592.
42. Ernest J. Weinrib, "Liberty, Community and Corrective Justice" (1988) 1 Can. J.L. & Juris. 3 at
4 [Weinrib, "Liberty"].
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ordering emanates from one conceptual "master feature" of the ordering,
defined as the single principle of intelligibility and justificatory impulse
necessary to our entire mental representation of the ordering. 43 In the
intrinsic order of tort, this master feature is the bipolar, correlative, and
unified connection between plaintiff and defendant, reflected in the
damages award.4' Bipolarity entails notional equality, a view that sees the
parties, in their pre-interaction positions, as equally entitled to ownership
of their physical or material holdings, notwithstanding the fact that
distributive inequalities might be reflected in those holdings. In a scheme
of notional equality, the quantity of each party's holdings immediately
prior to their interaction provides the baseline from which gain and loss
are imputed. 45 Pre-interaction comparisons of the parties' wealth, need,
virtues, or social positions are irrelevant.4 6 In tort law, understood as
corrective justice, injustice is akin to disruption of notional equality, rather
than noncompliance with distributive norms. On this view, tort law is
unconcerned with distributive justice.
For Weinrib, the concepts of correlativity, abstraction, and agency,
grounded in notionally equal interaction, infuse tort with normative
content. Weinrib distills these concepts into normative precepts, using
Kant's philosophy of natural right. In Kantian philosophy, law is
understood as the juridical manifestation of self-determining agency.
The defining characteristic of self-determining agency is the individual's
ability to abstract from his or her particular circumstances; individuals
are equal in their bare capacity to abstract.47 Individuals are possessed
with moral personality: the ability to form and promote a conception of
their own good, apart from the conception of any particular good. Moral
personality is a locus of self-determining activity, separate from the world.
Separation from the world allows individuals to use the world for activity
and appropriation, and entitles individuals to resist the encroachment of
the world upon their personality. In interactive relationships, the right of
moral personality is expressed in the idea of juridical honour. The content
of juridical honour is expressed in the maxim "do not make yourself into
a mere means for others, but be at the same time an end for them." In the
formalist theory, tort law, understood as corrective justice, is primarily
a system of negative freedom, defined by duties obliging recognition of
juridical honour.48
43. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 33 at 10; supra note 18 at 417.
44. Weinrib, "Special Morality," supra note 28 at 410.
45. Weinrib, "Corrective Justice," supra note 18 at 408, 411.
46. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 33 at 78.
47. Weinrib, "Corrective Justice," supra note 18 at 423.
48. Weinrib, "Liberty," supra note 42 at 7.
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The formalist account of positive freedom, built on the Kantian
construction of personality, binds the normative core of tort with concerns
of autonomy over bodily integrity and choice. The fundamental project of
Kantian moral theory is to establish rights that protect the very capacity
to choose. Weinrib explains that self-determining agency presupposes
purposive activity, exercised through free will (the capacity for choice
independeit of inclination) and practical reason.4 9 Peter Benson argues
that individual freedom can only be realized, in the here and now, through
relationships with particularities from which the individual abstracts.
Benson draws a distinction between individuals and these particularities
or "things" (also referred to as "objects of choice" 0). Because things,
unlike individuals, have no intrinsic validity, they are morally available
for use by individuals. The moral possibility of using things implies
individuals have the bare moral capacity to choose to use things ("abstract
right").5 In Benson's view, the capacity for choice is of central normative
significance.52 Indeed, it defines the positive aspect of moral personality.
In the Kantian view, personality is secured by protecting the capacity
to choose. This requires two sets of protections: rights to bodily integrity
and rights to things. In Weinrib's version, because the body houses free
will, each individual has a right to physical security against injury by
another. 3 Benson argues that because free choice can only be exercised
through corporeal existence, and the relationship between the will and the
body is one of identity, rights to bodily integrity are innate and inalienable.
Abstract right imposes upon everyone a duty to respect the bodily integrity
of others, but imposes no duty on individuals to respect their own bodily
integrity.54 Protecting the capacity to choose also requires both rights to
ownership of things (in Weinrib's language, "external objects of the will")
and to free exchange of things. Since exercising one's will to acquire a
thing is central to personality, individuals have an entitlement to ownership
of things which they have brought under their exclusive control, through
an external manifestation of will, prior to others, which all others have a
duty to respect.5 Ownership thus understood includes rights to possession,
use, and alienation of things. Rights to bodily integrity and rights to things
are fundamentally different in their constitutional repercussions, as I will
49. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 33 at 88-90.
50. Peter Benson, "The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice" (1992)
77 Iowa L. Rev. 515 at 569.
51. Ibid. at 562.
52. Ibid. at 565.
53. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 33 at 128.
54. Benson, supra note 50 at 577-578.
55. Benson, supra note 50 at 543, 584-585.
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argue later in the paper. For the time being, however, we need only note
the intimate relationship of tort with autonomy over bodily security and
choice, established at a highly abstract level in the formalist account of
corrective justice.
Stephen Perry develops a less formal, but similarly pre-political and
conceptual "outcome-responsibility theory" of corrective justice. Like
Weinrib and Benson, Perry sees tort as based in core, pre-political normative
concerns of autonomy over bodily integrity and fundamental choice. Perry
argues that while the formalist Kantian version of corrective justice provides
a basis for defining morally wrong conduct, it fails to provide a conceptual
account of why tort obliges defendants to fully compensate plaintiffs for
their loss.5 6 To establish this link, Perry argues that personhood is defined
by choice and an awareness of being capable of making a difference in the
world. Choosing is like betting, where the risks and payoffs are unknown
in advance. 7 Because we are aware of our capacity to make a difference,
we identify with the outcomes of our actions through a notion of control.58
In a normative and social sense, we have an awareness of responsibility
for our outcomes, and of others' responsibility for their outcomes. We
justify our actions through a retrospective evaluation of how our outcomes
made a difference in the world. If the outcome of our action is bad, we
regret both the action and the outcome ("agent-regret").5 9 In a relational
setting, harmful outcomes are those that result in a setback to another's
personal autonomy, understood as the interest each individual has in
choosing projects and opportunities. 60 Agent-regret founds the defendant's
obligation to fully compensate the plaintiff for intentional or objectively
avoidable harm to bodily integrity or property. Like the Kantian formalist
account, Perry establishes a close connection between the structure of tort
law and the concerns underlying s. 7. Perry also provides a more specific
account of the tie between bodily integrity, choice, and a defendant's
responsibility to pay a complete damages award.
The theories of Jules Coleman and Arthur Ripstein straddle corrective
justice and reciprocity theory. These theories provide a less abstract,
more pragmatically conceptual view of the relationship between tort law,
autonomy over bodily integrity, and choice. Instead of starting with the
idea of notional equality, Coleman and Ripstein argue that tort, in its purest
form, is about balancing the liberty and security interests of plaintiffs and
56. Perry, "Moral Foundations," supra note 16 at 479-488.
57. Ibid at 488, 492.
58. Perry, "Distributive Turn," supra note 31 at 331.
59. Stephen Perry, "Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three Conceptions of Corrective
Justice" in Tort Theory, supra note 24, 24 at 40-41 [Perry, "Loss, Agency, and Responsibility"].
60. Perry, "Moral Foundations," supra note 16 at 498.
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defendants.6' Taking this conceptual view, neither theorist can structure
the normative content of tort on natural, abstract right. Instead, both
need a normative political theory, dovetailing with this structural balance
between liberty and security. For Coleman, this theory is developed through
the straightforward proposition that the structure and content of tort is
coherent with our ordinary liberal moral practices, valuing autonomy and
well being.62 A duty to repair losses is justified because responsibility for
our actions is the flip side of a liberal emphasis on autonomous choice.
63
Torts are offences against autonomy and integrity; personal injury damages
are specifically designed to affirm autonomy and integrity. As a practical
extension of his theory, Coleman objects to policy proposals, such as
contracts for care, which restrict plaintiffs' choices of how to use their
damage awards.64
Ripstein's normative theory of tort is more complicated. Ripstein
starts with a Rawlsian conception of moral personality. On this view,
individuals are equal in their capacity to have both a sense of their own
good, and a sense ofjustice. 65 Individuals are both rational (self-interested)
and reasonable, moved by a desire to live in a society characterized by
fair terms of interaction. 66 Because individuals are rational, they require
a private realm: a space in which each has the right to pursue his or her
chosen life plans, and where each has a corresponding responsibility for
what they make of their lives. The private realm is public, in the sense
that individuals cannot pursue their own conceptions of the good life
in abstraction from others. In order to pursue and give meaning to the
life plans each chooses in the private realm, individuals need resources,
including their bodily powers and property.67 Because they are reasonable,
individuals must treat everyone as equally free to use their bodily powers
and property in the private realm. Each person needs their bodily powers
and property to give meaning to their choices, so no one is entitled to injure
another's bodily integrity or damage their goods. Like Coleman, Ripstein
applies his argument in the practical context of personal injury tort reform.
Focusing on concerns of autonomy and choice, Ripstein argues that while
61. Jules Coleman and Arthur Ripstein, "Mischief and Misfortune (Annual McGill Lecture in
Jurisprudence and Public Policy)"(1996) 41 McGill L.J. 91 at 109.
62. Jules Coleman, "The Practice of Corrective Justice" (1995) 37Ariz. L. Rev. 15 at 26. [Coleman,
"Corrective Justice"].
63. Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992) at 437 [Coleman,
Risks and Wrongs].
64. Coleman, "Personal Injury," supra note 19 at 230.
65. Rawls, Justice, supra note 4 at 505.
66. Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1999) at 7 [Ripstein, Equality].
67. Ripstein, "Division," supra note 31 at 1832.
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some administrative restrictions on the tort system (such as mandatory
insurance and no fault liability) are justified under the Rawlsian view,
schemes that substitute scheduled payments for private rights infringe too
heavily on individual independence.68
The original version of reciprocity theory, developed by George Fletcher
in the early 1970s, also argues that personal injury damages are essential
to autonomy over bodily integrity. While the theory is normatively thin,
some points are useful for our purposes. Fletcher uses a doctrinal version
of conceptual analysis. Case law in intentional torts, negligence, and strict
liability exhibits a consistent theme: liability should be imposed where
the defendant has created a non-reciprocal risk, exposing the plaintiff to
greater risk than the risks imposed on the defendant by the plaintiff. A
single principle of fairness is derived from this theme: all individuals have
the right to the maximum degree of security, compatible with a like security
for everyone else. 69 As part of this equal right of security, tort law protects
a zone of individual interests, including bodily integrity and property, from
intrusions designed to further other interests. Damages are the surrogate
for the individual's right to equal security.70 The critical point in Fletcher's
analysis is this connection between damages and equal security, expressed
as a zone of autonomy over bodily integrity and property rights.
Civil recourse theory, developed by Zipursky and Goldberg, connects
tort to autonomy and choice by focusing on the primary role of plaintiffs
in the litigation process. Using a pragmatically conceptual approach,
civil recourse theory argues that the single master feature of tort (to use
Weinrib's language) is the "principle of civil recourse": that a plaintiff is
entitled to act against one who has legally wronged him or her.7 While
sympathizing with corrective justice theory, Zipursky critiques the
centrality of notional equality in the formalist account. Zipursky points out
that there are three basic, structural features of tort law that diverge from
notional equality. First, tort law contains many remedies unconcerned
with restoring notional equality (for example, punitive damages). Second,
tort law often bars recovery in situations where a defendant would have
a moral duty to compensate the plaintiff under corrective justice theory.
Third, until the plaintiff commences court action and obtains a judgment,
tort law imposes only a liability for damages, not a duty to pay damages.
72
Tort law is about the plaintiff's right to sue, not only the defendant's duty
to pay. On a structural level, tort is about providing plaintiffs with one
68. Ripstein, "Division," supra note 31 at 1837.
69. Fletcher, supra note 27 at 550.
70. Fletcher, supra note 27 at 568.
71. Zipursky, supra note 29 at 735.
72. Zipursky, supra note 29 at 709-720.
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type of fundamental choice: the choice of whether or not to sue to obtain
redress for a wrong.
The normativity flowing from the principle of civil recourse is informed
by historical beliefs protecting bodily integrity and choice. These beliefs
are founded in two sources: ancient common law theory and contractarian
natural rights theory. Following Coke and Blackstone, Goldberg draws on
the idea of the Ancient Constitution: the understanding of early common
law lawyers that a thick crust of unwritten national and local custom
informed the natural structure of ruler and ruled.73 For Coke, the Ancient
Constitution put an obligation on the King, expressed in Chapter 29 of the
Magna Carta, to ensure each Englishman's best birth right, including his
body, life, honour, and goods, was protected from wrongful injury. English
liberty was achieved through law, not apart from it.74 In accordance with
this view, Blackstone argued that personal actions were designed to
vindicate absolute rights to life, liberty, and property.75 Similarly, in Locke's
construction of the State of Nature, individuals have an inalienable right to
self-preservation, which includes the right to seek reparation from those
who have harmed their life, health, liberty or possessions. By entering into
civil society, individuals give up their right to act as judge and executioner
over others, but not their right to self-preservation and redress for wrongs
committed against their life, health, liberty or property. 76 Reasoning from
this historical and contractarian base, Goldberg argues that the principle of
civil recourse puts moral limits on present day measures capping personal
injury damages.
Like civil recourse theory, substantive equality theory critiques the
formalist account of corrective justice for ignoring basic features of
tort law. The substantive equality argument, based on recent doctrinal
developments, is less structural than the civil recourse view, and focuses
specifically on the Canadian context. Ken Cooper-Stephenson argues that
while Canadian tort doctrine has a corrective core, the normative content of
tort is driven by distributive egalitarianism. 7  Redefinition by the courts of
threshold questions in negligence and nuisance (particularly developments
defining loss, fault requirements, and duties of care) consistently protect
the disadvantaged at the expense of the privileged. 78 Substantive equality
sees tort as a complex mix of corrective and distributive concerns;
73. John Goldberg, "The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for
the Redress of Wrongs" (2005) 115 Yale L.J. 524 at 533.
74. Ibid. at 534.
75. Ibid. at 548.
76. Ibid. at 541.
77. Cooper-Stevenson, supra note 30 at 57.
78. Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 30 at 53-56.
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depending on the context, one approach or the other might dominate. To
the extent tort has a structure, the mode of structuring lies on the middle
ground between corrective and distributive justice. While not an entirely
"liberal" theory, substantive equality sees the newly distributive drive of
tort as ignited, fueled, and defined by the liberal rights enshrined in the
Charter.79 For Cooper-Stephenson, the normativity of tort emanates from
Charter values; in substantive equality theory, the connection between tort
and Charter rights is indeed tight. In a prescriptive context, substantive
equality theory would favour constitutional scrutiny of some types of
damages caps, given the adverse effect such caps have on disadvantaged
groups.80
Applying the constituent theories of the liberal justice standpoint
establishes multiple points of connection between tort law, personal
injury damages, autonomy over bodily integrity, and choice. Four general
observations solidify this bond. First, the connections are broad based: each
constituent theory in the standpoint establishes some sort of connection
between the relevant concepts. Second, taken as a whole, the bond operates
at multiple levels of analysis: from pure philosophical abstraction, to
political theory, political culture, and historicism, through to present day
doctrinal analysis. Third, several constituent theories, such as corrective
justice and reciprocity, establish theoretical connections on the specific
issue of damages, particularly personal injury damages. Fourth, several
theorists make normative points about tort reform, criticizing certain types
of policies that control or cap damages as morally unjust. From a liberal
justice standpoint, the bond between the "economic benefit" of personal
injury damages and the values underlying s. 7 runs strong and deep.
All of this suggests that a present day court, using s. 7 to scrutinize
a damages cap regime, would have little reason to follow the framers'
intent argument used in Whitbread This is not to say that Whitbread, in
its late 1980s context, was wrongly decided. At the time Whitbread was
decided, it would have been difficult for the Court to find the doctrinal
foothold necessary to give Whitbread's damages claim constitutional
status. S. 7 doctrine, in the cases discussed earlier, and others, has now
solidly established that foothold. Further, at the time Whitbread was
decided, instrumental theories of tort dominated academic discourse. The
79. Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 30 at 68, 160. Cooper-Stephenson does not identify his
standpoint as liberal. Although in general, I find Cooper-Stevenson's work expresses heavy liberal
egalitarian themes, it also at points has some critical and communitarian flavours. For example,
Cooper-Stevenson argues for recognition of some types of difference in tort doctrine, such as a
culturally specific reasonableness standard in negligence: Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 30 at 60.
80. For a detailed empirical analysis, see Lucinda M. Finley, "The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform:
Women, Children, and the Elderly" (2004) 53 Emory L.J. 1263.
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bulk of scholarship articulating the bond between liberal justice and tort
compensation has been developed in the post-Whitbread era.
Having largely disposed of the framers' intent argument, two problems
remain in our examination of Whitbread. First, the bond we have established
relates to private intrusions on choice and autonomy over bodily integrity;
we have yet to theorize how the notion of state interference is engaged
by restrictions on damages. Second, the bond extends beyond the present
doctrinal boundaries of s. 7, including a broad range of property rights
within its scope. I turn now to the first of these problems, raised directly
by the state action argument.
IV. The state action argument: equivalence, self-protection, and
monopolization
In Whitbread, McLachlin J. reasoned that any interference with
Whitbread's life, liberty, and security of the person was not caused by
the Act, but by the accident leading to Whitbread's injuries. The Act only
inflicted an inability to recover money for physical loss: in large part,
Whitbread's physical suffering would continue in any event." For the
Court of Appeal, the element of state interference necessary to engage
Charter protection was not engaged. Examined closely, this argument
rests on one fundamental assumption: that a dichotomy can legitimately
be posed between post-interaction damages, and pre-interaction rights
to liberty and security. Using Weinribian language, the Court of Appeal
assumed an instrumentalist characterization of damages as "satisfactions
rather than rights."82 Since we have already seen that liberal justice sees
tort as a system for protecting rights, not welfare, we have the perspective
necessary to question the legitimacy of this dichotomy.83 Refining our
analysis from this general view, we can analyze exactly how liberal
justice equates damages caps to direct interference with individual rights.
To make this point, the standpoint of liberal justice uses the distinct but
related concepts of equivalence, self-protection, and monopolization.
The standpoint of liberal justice sees damages awards as the juridical
equivalent of the plaintiff's pre-interaction rights to bodily integrity,
autonomy, and choice. This theme runs consistently throughout the various
theories informing our standpoint. In Fletcher's version of reciprocity
theory, damages are the surrogate for the right to equal security.84 In
Weinrib's formalist theory of corrective justice, the unity of the plaintiff's
pre-interaction rights and the damages award is explained in the correlative
81. Whitbread (C.A.), supra note 3 at 522.
82. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 33 at 132.
83. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 33 at 130.
84. Fletcher, supra note 27 at 568.
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structure of rights and duties. The commission of a tort does not extinguish
the plaintiff's pre-interaction rights; instead, the damages award is the
expression of the defendant's continuing duty to respect the plaintiff's
pre-interaction rights. 5 Throughout, the structure of right and duty
remains the same. Coleman's political theory of corrective justice argues
that commission of a tort does not, in itself, restrict the plaintiff's pre-
interaction rights to moral autonomy over his or her person and property.
Instead, a conventional personal injury damages award preserves the
plaintiff's pre-interaction normative status. Tort remedies are designed so
that while the plaintiff's particular life plans may be changed by a wrongful
injury, his or her normative status remains the same.16 By restricting the
conventional damages remedy, the state violates the plaintiff's normative
status - in Coleman's words, adding insult to injury.87 In explaining the
historical basis of civil recourse theory, Goldberg notes that a version of
this argument was advanced by 17 h century common law theorists, who
saw any exercise of the King's dispensing power to limit private suits
as a direct violation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Ancient
Constitution.88 On the equivalence view, there is no conceptual difference
between state restrictions on damages, and direct state interference with
pre-interaction rights to bodily integrity, autonomy, and choice.
In civil recourse theory, this equivalence between pre- and post-
interaction rights is established in a natural right to self-protection.89 In
Locke's social contract theory, individual rights to life, health, liberty and
possessions include a right of self-preservation of those rights. As part of
self-preservation, individuals have two entitlements: to act in self-defence
against forcible attack, and to seek material reparation from wrongdoers
through self-help. Both entitlements survive the transition to civil society,
albeit in modified fashion. Through the social contract, individuals promise
to channel their right to self-defence through criminal law, and their
rights to reparation through tort law. In consideration of these promises,
the state is affirmatively obliged to provide such law.9° To abstain from
interference with natural rights to life, liberty, and property, the state must
allow plaintiffs to act against defendants in a certain way, and is obliged
to provide plaintiffs with an avenue of recourse through which they can
do this.91 Using the self-protection argument, civil recourse theorists have
85. Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 33 at 135.
86. Coleman, "Personal Injury," supra note 19 at 230-231.
87. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, supra note 63 at 438-439.
88. Goldberg, supra note 73 at 540.
89. Zipursky, supra note 29 at 736.
90. Goldberg, supra note 73 at 541-544.
91. Zipursky, supra note 29 at 737.
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strenuously argued for the recognition of a constitutional right to a range of
damages sufficient to provide plaintiffs with an adequate level of redress
for wrongs.92 Interestingly, recent Canadian jurisprudence provides a
doctrinal opening for this argument. Since Whitbread, the Supreme Court
of Canada has accepted that in some circumstances, a failure by the state
to provide certain types of law will constitute aprimafacie violation of the
right to security of the person.93
Extending the contractarian argument, civil recourse theory argues
that constitutional protection of tort law is morally justified by the
empirical fact of state monopolization. Goldberg argues the state should be
constitutionally obliged to provide positive rights to certain services, where
those services are unique to the state, and historically monopolized by the
state. 94 One of these services is an adequate mode of civil recourse. The
modem state has covered the field of civil recourse, by legally restricting
self-help remedies to civil litigation. As Zipursky points out, criminal law
prevents a victim from seizing a negligent wrongdoer's cash, or forcing
a newspaper editor, at gunpoint, to retract a defamatory article.95 This
monopolization reasoning has solid doctrinal support in contemporary
Canadian Charter doctrine. In Chaoulli, for example, McLachlin C.J. and
Major J. used this type of reasoning to find state interference with life,
liberty, and security of the person in the context of prohibitions on private
health insurance. The Court wrote:
The Canada Health Act, the Health Insurance Act, and the Hospital
Insurance Act do not expressly prohibit private health services. However,
they limit access to private health services by removing the ability to
contract for private health care insurance to cover the same services
covered by public insurance. The result is a virtual monopoly for the
public health scheme. The state has effectively limited access to private
health care except for the very rich, who can afford private care without
need of insurance. This virtual monopoly, on the evidence, results in
delays in treatment that adversely affect the citizen's security of the
person.96
This is actually a more expansive version of Goldberg's argument. To
engage the notion of state interference, the "virtual" monopolization by
the state of a particular service is sufficient. Applying this reasoning, we
can easily conclude that the Canadian state has a "virtual monopoly" over
92. Goldberg, supra note 73 (generally).
93. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General) (2003),
234 D.L.R. (4"h) 257 at 273.
94. Goldberg, supra note 73 at 595.
95. Zipursky, supra note 29 at 734.
96. Chaoulli, supra note 38 at 622.
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the field of personal injury damages. On the monopolization view, state
interference is engaged by restricting those damages.
The equivalence, self-protection, and monopolization arguments
collapse the analytical dichotomy critical to the state action argument in
Whitbread. If damages are the moral equivalent to rights, if rights include an
entitlement to act in protection of one's rights, and if the state monopolizes
the means for acting in protection of one's rights, yet provides no mode
of so doing, the state has acted to interfere with those rights. In one way,
our conclusion here is limited. We have not proven that the state action
argument is wrong from all standpoints: from an instrumentalist point of
view, the dichotomy between rights and damages may make perfect sense.
However, our analysis shows that the state action argument fails to reflect
the standpoint of liberal justice, and runs against some recent trends in
Charter jurisprudence. Perhaps, then, a contemporary court reconsidering
Whitbread from a liberal perspective would be more concerned with our
last problem, expressed in the anti-Lochner argument.
V. The anti-Lochner argument: private justice, distributive justice, and
the realm of constitutional adjudication
The anti-Lochner argument used in Whitbread has a long history. For the
Court of Appeal, granting constitutional status to Whitbread's claim would
open s. 7 to claims involving a broad range of property rights, including
contract rights and corporate rights to licensing for the purposes of carrying
out profit-seeking activities. 97 In the early part of the 2 0 th century, the U.S.
Supreme Court, invoking Lochner,98 had used the Fourteenth Amendment
to strike down progressive social legislation as unconstitutional state
interference with property rights and freedom of contract. While Lochner
was ultimately overturned, Peter Hogg observes that the shadow of
Lochner influenced both the exclusion of property rights from the text of
the Charter, and the Supreme Court of Canada's approach to interpreting
s. 7: in Canada, the Charter was not to be used to protect laissez-faire
economics.99 The most recent mark of this influence can be seen in the
dissenting opinion of Binnie and Lebel JJ. in Chaoulli, who explicitly
referenced Lochner in explaining that s. 7 does not protect freedom of
contract.' ° In Whitbread, anti-Lochner concerns were the primary worry
of the Court of Appeal. Simply put, the Court of Appeal was unable to
draw a principled distinction between personal injury damages and
97. Whitbread (CA.), supra note 3 at 521.
98. Supra note 14.
99. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf, vol. II (Scarborough: Carswell, 1997)
(updated to 2005) at 44-9.
100. Chaoulli, supra note 38 at 650.
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property rights for the purposes of the Charter, so they excluded both from
protection under s. 7.
In the remainder of this paper, I argue that the standpoint of liberal
justice establishes such a distinction. At first blush, this seems problematic.
On a philosophical level, liberal justice protects rights to both bodily
integrity, understood as rights not to have physical harm inflicted on one's
body by another, and to property, understood as rights not to have harm
or taking inflicted on one's "things" by another. On an abstract level,
there are conceptual parallels between the two. For the constitutional
purposes of a modem liberal democracy, however, the standpoint of liberal
justice draws a clear distinction between these two types of rights. Two
justifications support this distinction. First, only rights to bodily integrity
are fully morally justified in a comprehensive view of social justice in
a modem liberal democracy. Second, only rights to bodily integrity are
constitutionally essential in a modem liberal democracy. According to these
two justifications, constitutional protection of rights to bodily integrity is
desirable. Constitutional protection of property rights is not.
In the context of damages caps, I argue that this distinction allows some
limited constitutional protection for personal injury damages. Personal
injury awards are composed of several distinct heads of damages: non-
pecuniary loss, loss of income and earning capacity, and past and future
cost of care, for example. Applying a comprehensive view of justice and
the theory of constitutional essentials, I argue that constitutional status can
and should be granted to two particular heads of damages: non-pecuniary
loss and cost of care. On the view I construct, this can be done without
collapsing the constitutional distinction between bodily integrity and
property rights. To grant constitutional status to other heads of damage,
however, would collapse the distinction.
The first justification for a distinction between rights to bodily integrity
and property rights flows from the relationship between private justice and
distributive justice. For the purposes of this paper, I use the term "private
justice" to describe both corrective justice and redress. Private justice
applies in the relationship between two individuals. The standpoint of
liberal justice sees private justice as structured more or less on rights to
notional equality. Some of our constituent theories see notional equality
in quantitative terms, some in qualitative terms, and some see notional
equality as merely the primary, not the only, concern of private justice.
Despite their differences, all claim that private justice protects the pre-
interaction holdings of the parties. As a whole, the standpoint of liberal
justice sees tort law as part of private justice. In contrast, distributive justice
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involves state allocation of goods, resources, services or commodities.''
The goal of distributive justice is to allocate these resources to members
of the community in compliance with a politically chosen criterion of
distribution, on the basis of particular characteristics of each member.02
Distributive justice applies in the relationship of a group of individuals as
members of a community.
From the standpoint of liberal justice, both private justice and
distributive justice are required in a comprehensive system of social
justice. Liberal theory provides two explanations of this relationship. The
first explanation sees distributive justice as a necessary prerequisite for any
morally justified exercise of private justice. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls
takes the view that a system of private justice presupposes an account of
what properly belongs to a person and what is due to him.0 3 Rawls, of
course, goes on to provide such an account of distributive justice. Perry,
like Rawls, simply assumes that in corrective justice, the parties' pre-
interaction holdings reflect the due of each under distributive justice. 104
For example, Perry argues that if a particular system of private property
is justified in moral or political terms, then the obligation of restoration
in corrective justice is also justified. °0 Since corrective justice focuses on
harm to entitlements, not distributions, it is conceptually and normatively
independent of distributive justice. But harm is of no moral significance
in corrective justice unless the victim's claim to the harmed entitlement
is morally legitimate. 10 6 Ripstein expands on this Rawlsian assumption.
For Ripstein, a comprehensive system of justice involves a "division
of responsibility" between corrective and distributive justice. Because
both corrective and distributive justice flow from moral personality,
corrective justice can only operate against a framework of redistributive
institutions. '0
More intricate versions of this explanation are developed by Cooper-
Stephenson and Coleman.0 8 For Coleman, distributive justice imposes
constraints on the pre-interaction holdings corrective justice sustains. But
101. Serge-Christophe Kolm, Modern Theories of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996) at
33.
102. Benson, supra note 50 at 535-36; Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 33 at 212.
103. Rawls, Justice, supra note 4 at 10-1I1.
104. Perry, "Moral Foundations," supra note 16 at 453.
105. Perry, "Moral Foundations," supra note 16 at 454.
106. Perry, "On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice", in Jeremy Horder,
ed., Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 237 at 254 [Perry, "Corrective and
Distributive Justice"].
107. Ripstein, "Distributive Turn," supra note 31 at 1836.
108. Perry now appears to approve of Coleman's view on this issue. See Perry, "The Mixed Conception
of Corrective Justice" (1992) 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 917 at 918 [Perry, "Corrective Justice"].
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these constraints are broad and pragmatic. So long as distributive justice
can justify pre-interaction holdings as worthy of protection against private
infringements, those holdings need not perfectly comply with a first-best
theory of distributive justice. Within this system of rough justice, the state
is at liberty to intervene with measures designed to mould patterns of pre-
interaction holdings to the first-best theory.10 9 Substantive equality theory
takes a more aggressive view. In substantive equality theory, private justice
legitimately operates in a corrective mode when pre-interaction holdings
are justly distributed. But private justice retains its potency where there is
no pre-interaction foundation of distributive justice. In these situations,
private justice legitimately departs from its corrective basis and takes a
distributive form, ultimately changing the scope and character of pre-
interaction holdings." 0 In all its forms, the first explanation argues that
private justice requires a foundation of distributive justice.
The second explanation, advanced in Kantian theories of corrective
justice, takes the converse view. Weinrib concedes that corrective justice
may well operate against a distributive background. But if corrective justice
depends on a distributive foundation, corrective justice collapses into
distributive justice. Private justice becomes an incoherent, instrumental
tool for enforcing distributive justice. To retain coherence as an ordering,
corrective justice must theoretically operate on pre-interaction holdings
regardless of whether they reflect a just distribution."' Benson offers a
similar analysis. Because corrective justice flows from abstract right, it
operates conceptually (but not temporally) prior to distributive justice,
since distributive justice flows from a less abstract view of personality.
Principles of distributive justice suitable to a Rawlsian conception of
personality, for example, must always respect abstract right because
abstract right embodies the most elementary conception of the person.
Corrective justice is lexically prior to distributive justice. 2 On the Kantian
view, the moral justification of corrective justice requires no theoretical tie
whatsoever with distributive justice.
This does not mean that on the Kantian explanation a comprehensive
system of justice has no distributive component. While Weinrib sees
distributive justice operating independently from corrective justice,
he still believes distributive justice is a fundamental mode of ordering
relationships." 3 Benson goes further, arguing that distributive justice is
109. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, supra note 63 at 351-353.
110. Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 30 at 158-159.
111. Weinrib, "Corrective Justice," supra note 18 at 419-421.
112. Benson, supra note 50 at 606-608.
113. Weinrib, "Corrective Justice," supra note 18 at 416.
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necessary for corrective justice to operate in concrete circumstances. To
work in the real world, corrective justice needs a system to reasonably
impose individual claims on others through coercion. There must be
public principles to determine how external manifestations of the will are
communicated, what things and how much of a thing are acquired through
particular manifestations of the will, and the like. Without such principles,
there can be no socially established entitlements to anything." 4 To establish
these principles, a Rawlsian conception of personality is required, which
leads us to adopt Rawlsian principles of distributive justice. What and
how much persons can acquire is established by distributive justice."'
Abstract right and corrective justice are not infringed or collapsed by such
a system. Really, then, the two explanations of the relationship are not all
that different, since the second explanation of a comprehensive system of
justice, like the first, requires that the two modes of justice work together.
We can now return to the constitutional status of personal injury
damages. I assume that to have a legitimate claim to constitutional status
in the standpoint of liberal justice, a claim in private justice must fully
comply with the requirements of a comprehensive system of justice.
Having explained the workings of that system, we can analyze how
specific categories of private justice claims comply with that system.
Our discussion so far tells us that to be morally justified within the
comprehensive system, a claim must involve a pre-interaction right acquired
and held in accordance with distributive justice. Alternatively, the claim is
justified on the comprehensive view if it is not subject to the principles of
distributive justice. To prove that a particular category of claim is worthy
of constitutional status, we need to prove that it will always involve a pre-
interaction right acquired and held in accordance with distributive justice,
or will always involve a right not subject to distributive justice.
A distinction can be drawn between two general categories of claims.
The first category of claims (which I will call bodily claims) arises entirely
from pre-interaction rights to bodily integrity. The second category of
claims (which I shall call distributive claims) arises, directly or indirectly,
from pre-interaction rights to the subject matter of distributive justice:
goods, resources, or commodities. Bodily claims in private justice are
always justified in a comprehensive system ofjustice. From the standpoint
of liberal justice, rights to bodily integrity are not subject to principles
of distributive justice. Put simply, liberal justice does not require the
redistribution of body parts. From a Rawlsian perspective, we can say that
rights to bodily integrity fall within the first principle of justice, as part
114. Benson, supra note 50 at 609-10.
115. Benson, supro note 50 at 611, 617.
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of freedom of the person, lexically prior to distributive justice." 6 From a
Dworkinian perspective, we can say that the ownership of bodily powers
is not subject to a political scheme of equality of resources." 7 From a
Kantian perspective, we can say that since rights to bodily integrity are
inalienable, a legitimate system of distributive justice can never violate
those rights. Notionally equal rights to bodily integrity are always
justified in a comprehensive system of justice. On this comprehensive
view of justice, bodily claims are, as a category, worthy of constitutional
protection.
The same cannot be said of distributive claims. Since distributive
claims always arise from rights to goods, resources, or commodities, the
pre-interaction rights founding a distributive claim are always subject to
distributive justice. To conclude these rights are worthy of constitutional
protection, we would have to prove these rights always comply with a
first-best theory of distributive justice. In some futuristic state of affairs,
we might be able to draw this conclusion. In contemporary Canadian
society, it is impossible. One would be hard pressed to argue that all goods,
resources, and commodities in Canadian society are justly distributed. At
worst, we can say that private justice operates against a fundamentally
unequal and unjust distributive backcloth." 8 At best, we can say that the
present distribution is worthy of protection from private intrusion, but is
not a first-best distribution." 9 In either situation, distributive claims fit
imperfectly with a comprehensive system of justice. In the first situation,
granting constitutional status to distributive claims entrenches a system of
comprehensive injustice. In the second situation, granting constitutional
status to distributive claims prevents the state from implementing a first-
best system of distributive justice. That being the case, distributive claims,
as a category, are unworthy of constitutional protection.
We now have the tools to understand the first way the standpoint of
liberal justice supports my solution to the anti-Lochner problem. Claims
for non-pecuniary damages are bodily claims. An award of non-pecuniary
damages is composed of three conceptually separate but overlapping
categories of loss: pain and suffering, loss of amenities, and loss of
expectation of life. 120 Quantum awards for pain and suffering are generally
assessed without reference to the plaintiff's pre-interaction rights to things
other than their corporeal existence. Having suffered a similar injury, Bill
116. Rawls, Justice, supra note 4 at 61.
117. Ronald Dworkin, "What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources" (1981) 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
283 at 301.
118. Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 30 at 160.
119. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, supra note 63 at 352.
120. Andrews v. Grand & ToyAlberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 at 264, (1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452.
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Gates and a homeless person will receive a similar pain and suffering
award.' 2' So too with cost of care claims. The same medical aids and
services are required by a wealthy individual rendered a quadriplegic and
a poor individual rendered a quadriplegic. Both heads of damages can
be assessed in abstraction from the plaintiff's pre-interaction holdings of
goods, resources, services, and commodities. For these types of claims,
restoring pre-interaction rights can never infringe distributive justice. They
will always comply with the requirements of a comprehensive system of
justice. Accordingly, they may legitimately claim constitutional status.
The situation is reversed with damages for income loss and future
earning capacity. Each of these claims is a distributive claim. Instead of
abstracting from particularity, quantum assessment requires an examination
of the plaintiff's particular pre-interaction income and earning capacity.
Income has value only insofar as it enables the plaintiff to hold or acquire
goods, resources, services, and commodities. A plaintiff's right to a certain
amount of income is the equivalent of a right to hold or acquire a certain
amount of these things; it is a right established in distributive justice. One
might plausibly argue that in contemporary society a plaintiff's ability
to earn income does depend on his or her bodily integrity: for example,
his or her intelligence or physical fitness. But this does not turn a claim
for income loss into a bodily claim. Those things affect income only
because the current system of distributive justice allows them to affect
income. Under a different system of distributive justice, they might affect
income to a different degree, or not at all. If we assume some plaintiffs'
pre-interaction rights to income are not distributively just, claims for
income loss and loss of earning capacity will not always be justified in a
121. In rare cases there will, of course, be differences in non-pecuniary awards based on an assessment
of what the particular victim has lost in terms of welfare (utility), not just on the type of injury. My
assumption here admittedly passes over a theoretical objection that might be made, to the effect that
some individuals are "utility wizards" while others are "utility sinks", especially with regard to the
same sort of injury. For example, in Andrews, Dickson, J. refers to a concert pianist who loses a finger:
Ibid. at 263. However, I assume that an empirical argument could be made that similar injuries for the
most part result in similar non-pecuniary damages awards. The purpose of an award of non-pecuniary
damages is to provide compensation to provide physical arrangements to make life endurable: Ibid.
at 262. I assume, for the most part, that individuals suffering the same injury would require roughly
similar physical arrangements in order to live an endurable life. Even assuming some variation in
awards, granting the concert pianist a greater non-pecuniary damage award for a lost finger does
not turn a non-pecuniary damages award into a distributive claim, for two reasons. First, since the
award is still based on an inalienable right to corporeal existence. Second, it does not necessarily
compensate for a loss of naturally unequal talent per se: it simply reflects a different way of assessing
non-pecuniary loss (on the basis of loss of utility rather than on the basis of loss of resources).
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comprehensive system of justice. 22 As a result, these heads of damages
are unworthy of constitutional protection. On similar reasoning, contract
and property rights are also unworthy of constitutional protection.
123
The second justification for a principled, constitutional distinction
between rights to bodily integrity and property rights flows from the theory
of constitutional essentials developed by Rawls in Political Liberalism.1
24
Rawls says that two types of principles must be contained in a liberal
constitution: principles relating to the general structure of government,
and principles defining the equal rights and duties of citizenship. It
is this second category that concerns us for present purposes. This
category includes the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of
conscience, freedom of thought and association, and the protection of the
rule of law.125 Aside from a right to basic needs, principles of distributive
justice are not constitutional essentials. The difference principle is not a
constitutional essential; neither is fair equality of opportunity. The role of
the constitutional essentials is to protect components of the legal system
that are what they morally ought to be, so that the state can legitimately
enforce laws flowing from those components on individuals who might
regard those laws as wrong.
126
The content of the constitutional essentials is defined by three
basic justifications or criteria. 127 I shall call these reasons the urgency,
transparency, and unanimity criteria. The urgency criterion reasons that
protection of basic freedoms is the most pressing concern of society;
individuals need an immediate, graphic guarantee that all will enjoy
the basic liberties. 12 The transparency criterion involves the ability of
individuals to tell whether the constitutional essentials have been realized.
It is relatively easy to determine whether a constitution effectively protects
basic liberties. On the other hand, principles of distributive justice or fair
equality of opportunity, in their application in the dense factual matrix of
122. This is a fairly easy assumption to make. For further discussion on this point, see two examples
provided by Cooper-Stephenson, supra note 30 at 160. One example involves a plaintiff earning an
illegally depressed wage, another involves a plaintiff who suffered racial discrimination in hiring
practices. We can also easily imagine the flip side of this second example, i.e. a plaintiff who earns an
inflated wage because of discriminatory hiring practices.
123. 1 will not fully develop this reasoning here. However, we can observe that strict property
entitlements certainly engage distributive justice, and contract rights, to the extent they embody rights
to a certain amount of property, are also subject to distributive justice.
124. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1993) [Rawls, Political Liberalism].
125. Ibid. at 227.
126. Frank I. Michelman, "Justice as Fairness, Legitimacy, and the Question of Judicial Review: A
Comment" (2004) 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1407 at 1410.
127. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 124 at 230.
128. Michelman, supra note 126 at 1418.
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modem society, are too opaque for this kind of compliance check. 2 9 The
unanimity criterion requires that all individuals must be able to agree on
the constitutional essentials. As Lawrence Sager points out, principles of
distributive justice cannot be made the object of political consensus or
anything approaching such consensus. 30 While a just society must strive
toward distributive justice, a constitution that enshrines these principles is
practically over inclusive.
Expanding on Rawls's theory, Sager draws a distinction between
political constitutional essentials and adjudicative constitutional essentials.
Sager argues that the U.S. Constitution, in a political sense, enshrines
broad and expansive negative and positive rights (including rights to
minimum welfare and a right to reparation for historical injustice).
Although there is doctrinal evidence to show that the U.S. Supreme
Court recognizes such rights as part of the political constitution, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not judicially enforced those rights.' 3 ' The same could
be said for the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly
on a reading of cases like Gosselin v. Quebec.'32 On Sager's view, the
reason these broader rights are underenforced, and rightly so, is that they
involve ongoing projects subject to critique, adjustment and refocusing;
these rights cannot be enforced through a simple "doctrinal sweep" by
a court.'33 At the end of the day, the justiciability criterion restricts the
political constitutional essentials to a hard core of judicially enforceable
adjudicative constitutional essentials.
Rawls restricts the theory of constitutional essentials to the domain
of political justice, consistent with his focus on political justice. But there
is no reason that the theory cannot be used to assess the constitutional
status of personal injury damages. Doing so, we can see that my solution
to the anti-Lochner problem accords with the theory of constitutional
essentials, in both general and specific ways. Our discussion of bodily and
distributive claims in a comprehensive system of justice shows that my
solution complies with the role of constitutional essentials: bodily claims
(pain and suffering and cost of care) are constitutional essentials because
they are what they morally ought to be under a comprehensive system
of justice. Distributive claims (loss of income, loss of earning capacity,
estate and dependants' claims) are not constitutionally essential because
we cannot say they are what they morally ought to be.
129. Michelman, supra note 126 at 1420.
130. Lawrence G. Sager, "The Why of Constitutional Essentials" (2004) 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1421 at
1423.
131. Ibid. at 1424-1425.
132. [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, [2002] S.C.J. No. 85.
133. Sager, supra note 130 at 1431.
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At a more specific level, my solution complies with the four criteria
defining rights as constitutional essentials. As I have argued earlier, rights
to bodily integrity are first principle rights in a Rawlsian system. Similarly,
a sound argument can be made that parties behind the veil of ignorance
have a particular interest in being free from bodily injury.'34 Protecting
bodily claims is an important way of providing citizens with a graphic
guarantee of their equal rights to bodily integrity. Distributive claims are
overwhelmingly based on second principle rights, because the quantum
of a distributive claim is overwhelmingly dependent on principles of
distributive justice.'35 Recognizing distributional claims has little to do
with assuring citizens that their basic liberties are being respected. The
same reasoning applies with the transparency criterion. Since damages
awards for bodily claims are abstracted from particularity, it is relatively
easy for citizens to tell whether equal awards are being given for equal
injuries, respecting equal rights to bodily integrity. It is much harder for
citizens to tell whether a damages award for a distributional claim accords
with the principles of distributive justice necessary to fully justify that
claim.
Analyzing the remaining two criteria, we reach similar conclusions.
Unanimity cannot be achieved with distributional claims: citizens would
likely never be able to agree that any particular distributive claim is justified,
since consensus on any system of distributive justice is nearly impossible,
as Sager says. To use an example developed by Cooper-Stephenson in
another context, while some citizens might think a low -loss of income
award is justified where a plaintiff was a victim of discriminatory hiring
practices, other citizens would disagree.'36 Finally, distributive claims
are not justiciable. While it may be relatively easy for a court to make a
projection of a plaintiff's past, present, and future income loss resulting
from an accident ceterisparibus, it would be all but impossible for a court
to determine, in a dense factual situation, whether a particular plaintiff's
pre-interaction (or projected post-interaction) rights are unequivocally
traceable to a just distribution. Further, granting constitutional status to
these claims might restrict the ability of the state to implement a first-best
system of distributive justice. In contrast, it is relatively easy for a court to
assess whether a plaintiff has suffered a certain physical injury, the only
pre-requisite to establishing a morally just bodily claim.
134. Ripstein, "Division," supra note 31 at 1821.
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To summarize, bodily claims should be adjudicative constitutional
essentials because they involve clearly defined rights, abstracted
from distributive justice. Conversely, distributive claims should not
be adjudicative constitutional essentials, since they involve morally
ambiguous pre-interaction rights. For the same reasons Rawls makes
basic liberties constitutional essentials, we must include bodily claims
as adjudicative constitutional essentials. For the same reasons Rawls
excludes the difference principle and fair equality of opportunity from
the constitutional essentials, we must exclude distributive claims from the
adjudicative constitutional essentials. Applied to specific heads of damage,
pain and suffering and cost of care, being bodily claims, are adjudicative
constitutional essentials. Other heads of damage are not.
The implication of my argument is not that distributive claims are
unworthy of any judicial, legislative, or political protection. Coleman's
theory, for example, suggests there are good reasons for protecting these
rights as an applied version of a second-best comprehensive theory of
justice. There are also strong arguments for according constitutional status
to distributive claims in an equality rights context. But that is beyond the
scope of this paper. My argument here is simply that heads of damages
based on distributive claims should not be protected in the adjudicated
realm of s. 7 of the Charter.
Like my critiques of the framers' intent and state action arguments,
the theoretical basis for a principled distinction between bodily and
distributive claims was relatively undeveloped at the time Whitbread was
decided. Applying theoretical developments, the standpoint of liberal
justice provides exactly the type of distinction the Court of Appeal
was unable to develop in Whitbread. A comprehensive view of justice
draws this distinction at a philosophically conceptual level. The theory
of constitutional essentials justifies the distinction at a more concrete
level, engaging legal and political relationships between individuals, the
courts, and the Charter. By applying the distinction to legislated damages
caps, the courts can protect a sphere of individual autonomy over bodily
integrity and choice, while shutting out Lochneresque property claims.
While elements of the anti-Lochner argument still hold water, the argument
needs to be reworked. A realm of protection should be carved out for pain
and suffering claims, and for cost of care claims.
Conclusion: re-thinking Whitbread
I have only sketched the beginnings of a possible new approach to the
judicial review of damages caps under the substantive rights component
of s. 7. Moving forward with the argument requires detailed analysis
of the principles of fundamental justice and s. 1 justification. Given the
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historical status of compensatory rights in the common law tradition, it
may be difficult for the state to prove that untailored caps on damages for
non-pecuniary loss and cost of care accord with principles of fundamental
justice. Further, it seems unlikely that measures aimed primarily at
reducing insurance premiums could ever be justified by a s. 1 analysis.37
But there may be other goals underlying damages caps; this conclusion
would be premature without a detailed historical analysis. My solution
does not require that we retain our tort system in its present form, only
that we adequately protect the pre-interaction rights of plaintiffs. Schemes
that replace our system of tort compensation may be perfectly justified.
Systems that impose a quidpro quo between no-fault liability and quantum
of damages, or that impose a broader system of enterprise liability might
be perfectly compatible with the standpoint of liberal justice.138 In the case
of the Marine Liability Act, the state interest in complying with Canada's
international obligations may justify a damages cap on a s. 1 analysis.
Assessment of these further issues requires specific analysis of the aims
and means of particular legislative schemes implementing damages caps.
While I have focused on damages caps, my argument has potential
significance for other areas ofcontemporary tort law. Extending my analysis,
some aspects of workers' compensation schemes, such as the scheme at
issue in Budge,'3 9 would likely infringe the substantive rights guarantee
in s. 7. Legislation imposing ultimate time limitations, or abbreviated
time limitations for actions against certain types of defendants, such as
government bodies and public utilities, might also be subject to review.
40
Statutes that completely bar causes of action, such as the State Immunity
Act,14 1 would be ripe for re-examination. 42 But these provisions might also
be justified according to the principles of fundamental justice, or on a s.
1 analysis. Like the situation of damages caps, a contextual examination
of the particular aims, purposes, and mechanics of the relevant legislation
would be required.
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Extending the framework might also give rise to hard cases. Most
of these cases would involve situations where damage to or defects in
property results in actual or potential bodily injury. Three specific
examples highlight this point. 43 First, many provincial statutes exempt
farm operators for nuisance liability.' 4 Although a cause of action in
nuisance is, in the first instance, based on interference with a distributive
entitlement, damages for personal injury are available in nuisance actions.
Second, even in a lawsuit arising from a motor vehicle accident, a plaintiff
might sue for property damage to a non-bodily amenity that serves the
function of a bodily amenity, such as a wheelchair or a prosthetic limb.
Lastly, there are claims for costs to repair negligent defects in property
raising a risk of bodily injury.145 In all three examples, plaintiffs' claims
have both bodily and distributive aspects. Further analysis is necessary to
assess the viability of my framework for these hard cases.
Whitbread was decided nearly two decades ago. The Court of Appeal
was forced to explore the difficult middle ground where rights to life,
liberty, and security of the person intersect with claims expressed in
monetary terms. In that context, the Court of Appeal emphasized what the
Charter is not: a tool to impose positive obligations on the state to protect
laissez-faire economic rights. In a contemporary context, the courts have
theoretical and doctrinal tools necessary to revisit Whitbread, without
undermining the central concerns underpinning the Court of Appeal's
reasoning. It is possible to give Charter protection to certain claims for
personal injury damages, without enforcing a neo-conservative theory of
property rights. I have suggested a solution that reconciles concerns with
what the Charter is not, with concerns about what the Charter is: a tool for
protecting rights to autonomy over bodily integrity and choice from state
interference. Outside the context of damages caps, my solution may not
be completely viable. But at the end of the day, my general point is only
that it is possible, and desirable, to redefine the constitutional status of
compensatory remedies in a way that more fully recognizes the concerns
of liberal justice.
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